# 1NC

## OFF

### 1NC

Antagonism PIC

#### We advocate for a ‘demand the debate community adapt to include hybrid debaters.’ However, that selectively excludes the choice of ‘our’ OR any other frame that presumes the NEG is in opposition.

#### The impact is solidarity---it creates diverging coalitions by allowing competition to dictate a pertinent issue within the community that requires collective action.

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#### The role of the ballot is to determine the efficacy of a topical proposal relative to the status quo or a competing option.

#### The ‘United States federal government’ is the three branches.

U.S. Legal 16 [U.S. Legal; 2016; Organization offering legal assistance and attorney access; U.S. Legal, “United States Federal Government Law and Legal Definition,” <https://definitions.uslegal.com/u/united-states-federal-government/>]

The United States Federal Government is established by the US Constitution. The Federal Government shares sovereignty over the United Sates with the individual governments of the States of US. The Federal government has three branches: i) the legislature, which is the US Congress, ii) Executive, comprised of the President and Vice president of the US and iii) Judiciary. The US Constitution prescribes a system of separation of powers and ‘checks and balances’ for the smooth functioning of all the three branches of the Federal Government. The US Constitution limits the powers of the Federal Government to the powers assigned to it; all powers not expressly assigned to the Federal Government are reserved to the States or to the people.

#### Anticompetitive’ behavior are business practices that restrict competition without providing lower cost or higher quality goods and services

OECD 3 – OECD Glossary of Statistical Terms, from the Glossary of Industrial Organisation Economics and Competition Law, compiled by R. S. Khemani and D. M. Shapiro, commissioned by the Directorate for Financial, Fiscal and Enterprise Affairs, OECD, 1993, https://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=3145

Definition:

Anticompetitive practices refer to a wide range of business practices in which a firm or group of firms may engage in order to restrict inter-firm competition to maintain or increase their relative market position and profits without necessarily providing goods and services at a lower cost or of higher quality.

#### ‘Expanding the scope’ must increase the area covered by antitrust law.

Cesar A. Noble 17, Judge on the Connecticut Superior Court, Hartford Judicial District, 777 Residential, LLC v. Metro. Dist. Comm'n, 2017 Conn. Super. LEXIS 4178, \*4-5 (Conn. Super. Ct. August 1, 2017), 8/1/2017, Lexis

The defendant relies upon §7-249 as authority for the supplemental assessment. The statute provides that "[b]enefits to buildings or structures constructed or expanded after the initial assessment may be assessed as if the new or expanded buildings or structures had existed at the time of the initial assessment." The parties dispute whether the conversion of the property constitutes a construction or expansion of buildings or structures granting authority to the defendant to levy a supplemental assessment. The plaintiff argues that because the conversion did not constitute an expansion, that is, an increase in the volume or physical area of a building the defendant had no authority under §7-249 for the supplemental assessment. 5 In the view of the plaintiff it is significant that the conversion did not increase the physical footprint or interior square footage of the property in any way including by a vertical [\*5] enlargement. Absent such an increase, asserts the plaintiff, there can be no construction or expansion of any building or structure. The defendant assert that the construction of the 285 new residential units constitute new structures within the plain meaning of §7-249. The court agrees with the defendant.

[FOOTNOTE]

5 The plaintiff relies upon the definition of the word "expand" found in Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary (10th ed. 2002) of "to open up; to increase the extent, number, volume, or scope of."

#### The ‘core’ antitrust laws are Sherman, Clayton, and FTC.

Michael A. Rataj 21, PC, Law Degree from the Detroit College of Law, “Consequences for Breaking Antitrust Laws”, 5/12/2021, https://www.michaelrataj.com/blog/2021/05/consequences-for-breaking-antitrust-laws/

The core antitrust laws are…

The three core antitrust laws are the Sherman Act, the Federal Trade Commission Act and the Clayton Act. The Sherman Act primarily prohibits unreasonable restraint of trade and monopolization. Those who are in violation of the Sherman Act may face hefty fines, up to $100 million, and up to 10 years behind bars.

The FTC Act prohibits unfair practices or acts and unfair approaches to harming competition. Only the FTC can file cases under this act. The Clayton Act is a catch-all that covers every practice not covered by the Sherman and FTC Acts. Then consequences for violations of both of these acts are usually civil in nature.

#### Only topical affirmatives provide roles for each side key to the process of negation---two impacts:

#### 1) Clash---prepared negative strategies are based on method. Allowing the aff to skirt that question while retaining traditional competition standards makes being neg impossible. Clash is an intrinsic good and vital to the overall process of debate. An open topic prevents iteration through shallow debates, unpredictable advocacies, and lack of testing.

#### 2) Fairness---voluntary activities require it to actualize their benefits---only the ballot can adjudicate which model is fairest and overcome cognitive biases that otherwise cause a race to the bottom.

Hansson et al. 21, Kajsa Hansson, Ph.D. student at Linköping University, M.S. in Economics from Linköping University; Emil Persson, Senior Lecturer in the Department of Economics at Linköping University, Ph.D. in Economics from the University of Gothenburg; Shai Davidai, Assistant Professor in the Management Division of Columbia Business School, Ph.D. from Cornell University; Gustav Tinghög, Associate Professor in the Department of Management and Engineering at Linköping University, “Losing sense of fairness: How information about a level playing field reduces selfish behavior,” Journal of Economics Behavior & Organization, Vol. 190, October 2021, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2021.07.014

Why is aggressive, hostile, and selfish behavior so rampant in competitive settings? Using a novel experimental paradigm, we found that the absence of explicit information about a level playing field increases people’s tendency to engage in selfish behavior. Whereas participants who formed their own subjective beliefs about the fairness of a competition more frequently engaged in self-serving and selfish behavior, providing explicit information about the level playing field reduced such behavior. However, while this information reduced selfish behavior among losing participants, it did not affect behavior among winners of the competition. Losers who formed their own subjective beliefs of the playing field believed that the competition was unequally stacked against them. In contrast to losers who were informed about that both participants competed under the same sets of rules, they were more willing to engage in selfish behavior following the competition.

Our results suggest that information about a level playing field can reduce the “moral wiggle room” which people use to justify selfish behavior.9 Just as people are more prone to engage in selfish behavior when the consequences of their actions are sufficiently vague and uncertain, (e.g., Dana et al., 2007; Exley, 2016; Haisley and Weber, 2010), we find that the absence of explicit information about the procedure of a competition may have similar effects on selfish behavior, and especially so among those who end up losing.

How well people perform in competitive settings is the product of numerous factors, many of which are beyond people’s control. For instance, whether people perform well or poorly in a competition is determined by their inherent ability or skill, by the amount of effort they devote to the competition, by their opponents’ abilities and skills, by the amount of effort devoted by each of their opponent, by external factors that advance or hinder their and their opponents’ performance, and so forth. People typically focus on only a subset of such factors when thinking about their and others’ performance (Davidai and Gilovich, 2015). Yet, the myriad of elements that influence performance provide people with sufficient flexibility to feel as if their relative inferiority is due to factors outside their control rather than personal inadequacy. Consequently, by forcing people to take responsibility for their performance and learn from their failures, informing people about a level playing field may have other positive effects beyond reducing selfish behavior.

Our results are consistent with findings from previous studies showing that losing a competition increases the demand for redistribution, even when people make choices for two other participants (i.e. absent any selfish motives) (Cassar and Klein, 2019; Deffains et al., 2016; Espinosa et al., 2020). In line with the results from our study, Espinosa (2020) showed that when participants are informed that outcomes of a competition is determined by brute luck — i.e., whether one was randomly assigned to perform either a hard or an easy task — before the competition begins, winners and losers of the competition display similar redistributive preferences when making decisions for other people. We add to this literature by showing that the effect of informing people about a level playing field also decreases selfish behavior. Although previous studies have found that actual procedural unfairness that involves unequal opportunities increases unethical and selfish behavior (e.g., Banerjee et al., 2018; Fehr, 2018; Gill et al., 2013; Greenberg, 1990; Grosch and Rau, 2020; John et al., 2014), our findings highlight the immensely important role that perceived procedural fairness plays in zero-sum competitions, where resources are scarce, and several people compete for the same rewards.

Because disagreements regarding fairness may result in aggression, hostility, and conflict between successful and unsuccessful individuals, understanding when and why the outcomes of competitions are considered legitimate is extremely important. Simply put, leaving people “in the dark” regarding the playing field may undermine cooperation, trust, and legitimacy in society. Unfortunately, this dynamic is often seen in our own back yard, where wayward researchers tend to lose sight of the common goal of the scientific endeavor and instead engage in misconduct, fraud, and uncooperative behavior to promote their own selfish goals (e.g., John et al., 2012). We suggest that by bolstering people’s beliefs about a level playing field, transparency can reduce such self-serving and often-destructive research practices. Whereas arranging fair procedures and practices is of upmost importance for creating a more just and ethical society, informing people about this procedural fairness is key.

### 1NC

Capitalism K

#### The 1AC’s theorizing of hybrid debate reflects an investment in failure rooted in a negative conception of identity---the horizon of this reactive politics is revenge with no blueprint for collective liberation.

Wendy Brown 95. Professor of Women's Studies at the University of California, Santa Cruz., 1995, “States of Injury: Power and Freedom in Late Modernity,” Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995, pp. 69-71, <https://press.princeton.edu/titles/5715.html>

Enter politicized identity, now conceivable in part as both product of and reaction to this condition, where "reaction" acquires the meaning Nietzsche ascribed to it: namely, an effect of domination that reiterates impotence, a substitute for action, for power, for self-affirmation that reinscribes incapacity, powerlessness, and rejection. For Nietzsche, ressentiment itself is rooted in reaction – the substitution of reasons, norms, and ethics for deeds – and he suggests that not only moral systems but identities themselves take their bearings in this reaction. As Tracy Strong reads this element of Nietzsche's thought: Identity ... does not consist of an active component, but is reaction to something outside; action in itself, with its inevitable self-assertive qualities, must then become something evil, since it is identified with that against which one is reacting. The will to power of slave morality must constantly reassert that which gives definition to the slave: the pain he suffers by being in the world. Hence any attempt to escape that pain will merely result in the reaffirmation of painful structures. If the "cause" of ressentiment is suffering, its "creative deed" is the reworking of this pain into a negative form of action, the ''imaginary revenge" of what Nietzsche terms "natures denied the true reaction, that of deeds. " This revenge is achieved through the imposition of suffering "on whatever does not feel wrath and displeasure as ~~he does~~" (accomplished especially through the production of guilt), through the establishment of suffering as the measure of social virtue, and through casting strength and good fortune ("privilege," as we say today) as self-recriminating, as its own indictment in a culture of suffering: "it is disgraceful to be fortunate, there is too much misery. " But in its attempt to displace its suffering, identity structured by ressentiment at the same time becomes invested in its own subjection.' This investment lies not only in its discovery of a site of blame for its hurt will, not only in its acquisition of recognition through its history of subjection (a recognition predicated on injury, now righteously revalued), but also in the satisfactions of revenge, which ceaselessly reenact even as they redistribute the injuries of marginalization and subordination in a liberal discursive order that alternately denies the very possibility of these things and blames those who experience them for their own condition. Identity politics structured by ressentiment reverse without subverting this blaming structure: they do not subject to critique the sovereign subject of accountability that liberal individualism presupposes, nor the economy of inclusion and exclusion that liberal universalism establishes. Thus, politicized identity that presents itself as a self-affirmation now appears as the opposite, as predicated on and requiring its sustained rejection by a "hostile external world." Insofar as what Nietzsche calls slave morality produces identity in reaction to power, insofar as identity rooted in this reaction achieves its moral superiority by reproaching power and action themselves as evil, identity structured by this ethos becomes deeply invested in its own impotence, even while it seeks to assuage the pain of its powerlessness through its vengeful moralizing, through its wide distribution of suffering, through its reproach of power as such. Politicized identity, premised on exclusion and fueled by the humiliation and suffering imposed by its historically structured impotence in the context of a discourse of sovereign individuals, is as likely to seek generalized political failure ~~paralysis~~, to feast on generalized political impotence, as it is to seek its own or collective liberation through empowerment. Indeed, it is more likely to punish and reproach - "punishment is what revenge calls itself; with a hypocritical he it creates a good conscience for itself" than to find venues of self-affirming action.

#### Capitalism makes extinction inevitable through ecological catastrophe AND violence along racial and gendered lines.

Adrian Parr 15. Professor and Director of The Charles Phelps Taft Research Center at the University of Cincinnati, “The Wrath of Capital: Neoliberalism and Climate Change Politics – Reflections,” 4/20/15, Geoforum, Volume 62, http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geoforum.2015.03.012

In retrospect I wonder if I should have opened The Wrath of Capital with my closing remarks: ‘I close with the following proposition, which I mean in the most optimistic sense possible: our politics must start from the point that after 2050 it may all be over.’ (Parr, 2013: 147). The emphasis here is on maybe. A future world of rising oceans, extreme weather events, species extinction, pollution, and increasing inequity is not inevitable. If the human race continues on its current course, then the earth could very well become an inhospitable place for a great many species, people included. To change course though, humanity needs to begin with a healthy dose of critical realism and an optimistic understanding of the political opportunities climate change presents. Using a neoliberal framework to craft solutions to climate change produces a vicious circle that reinstates the selfsame social organization and broader sociocultural and economic structures that have led to global climate change. The Wrath of Capital shows that climate change is not just an economic, cultural, or technological challenge. It is a political dilemma. Rigorous thinking and broadening our understanding of flourishing and emancipatory politics are important resources we can use to counter the narrow-minded view that the free market will solve the challenges climate change poses. The central focus of The Wrath of Capital is how ‘opportunity’ is put to work in climate change politics. Is it a moralizing or political operation? The conclusion I draw is that thus far the neoliberal framework of climate change politics has turned it into a moralizing discourse. For as I show the discourse exposes a racist, sexist, privileged political subject who points the finger of blame in the direction of underdeveloped countries overpopulating the earth, the Chinese polluting the atmosphere, ‘primitive societies’ in need of ‘modernizing’ their economies and governments, and an inefficient and ineffectual public sphere that should hand the ownership and management of common pool resources over to the private sector. All are moralizing arguments presented under the umbrella of climate change solutions. It is therefore important we recognize these are not political arguments. Arguments of this kind do not view the ‘opportunity’ in question as a platform for transforming otherwise oppressive, exploitative, and coercive power relations. To briefly restate the argument I develop. I start with a now well known and oft cited fact that the scientific consensus is human activities are changing global climate. If this situation continues predictions for the future of all life on earth are far from good, and by some accounts these are quite simply catastrophic. Obviously we need to change course but the lingering question is how to do this? Unsurprisingly, given the prevailing economic and political influence neoliberalism currently has, solutions to the question of what to do about climate change have used a neoliberal point of reference. The principles of the free market, privatization, individualism, consumerism, and competition all shape the current direction of climate change politics. In the book I describe how the logic of the free market has resulted in a new brand of capitalism – climate capitalism – that has led to the creation of a market in pollution (cap and trade, or emissions trading) which has placed the limits climate change poses for capitalism back in the service of capital accumulation. Vast tracts of land have accordingly been turned into green energy farms (solar panels or wind farms), which in theory is a fabulous idea, but when practiced unchecked leads to land grabbing. Another form of land appropriation taking place under the guise of climate change solutions is the greening of cities. Green urbanism, as it is commonly called, refers to modifying cities so as to make them more environmentally friendly. This involves the creation of bike paths, green roofs, public transportation, green spaces, pedestrian friendly cities, efficient land use policies, and energy efficient buildings; all fabulous initiatives that potentially could improve the lives of all city dwellers. I show how green urbanism trumps equitable urbanism. Green urbanism in Chicago has also been used to justify demolishing public housing in a city where land values are growing and the poor are turned out on to the rental market with vouchers in hand designed to offset the higher rental costs. David Harvey fittingly calls this ‘accumulation by dispossession’, when public wealth is privatized and the poor are displaced (Harvey, 2003). The global population is expected to peak at just over 9 billion people in 2050. The argument is that more people will place the ecological balance of life on earth under serious strain, and along with more people comes more greenhouse gas emissions. Focusing on population numbers means that the population debate, as it figures within climate change political discourse, fails to acknowledge qualitative differences. For instance, not everyone impacts the climate equally. Not everyone has a dangerously high ecological footprint. The more well to do citizens of the world produce the greatest ecological burdens. Similarly the fear over China’s growing national emissions typically points to a growing Chinese middle class of eager consumers. However, comparing national greenhouse gas emissions does not honestly represent national emissions. One can easily be fooled into thinking China poses the greatest threat to achieving a global reduction in greenhouse gas emissions. However, if we consider how much dirty manufacturing high-income nations outsource to China then we come to realize that high-income nations are in large part responsible for China’s growing emissions. In addition, there are serious theoretical shortcomings to how per capita emissions statistics figure within climate change discourse. Rates of consumption rely upon the individual subject being the primary unit of analysis, at the expense of analyses that produce a nuanced examination of how different collective scenarios, such as household size and whether a person is an urban or rural dweller, also impact patterns of consumption. More importantly the per capita analysis of reproduction does not account for how inequity works within the larger discourse of reproductive rights. I ask: ‘Are the poor women from low-and middle-income countries having fewer babies so that the affluent can continue to consume a steady line of cheap commodities that are made by the cheap labor of these selfsame women?’ (Parr, 2013: 50). I use the example of women working at the plastic-recycling center in the Dharavi slum in Mumbai to explain that women being ‘liberated’ from the reproductive role traditionally assigned to them does not necessarily lead to emancipation. Indeed the women I met were working around the clock in filthy conditions with no workers rights returning to a tiny shack and a long list of domestic chores that had them working well into the night and rising before the sun came up. In this context the population debate fails to tackle the feminist problem of how women’s bodies are coded, and the location of female bodies in a matrix of power that is oppressive and exploitative. Tangentially related to the population debate is the growing concern over the diminishing quality and quantity of potable water. For example, the United Nations ‘predicts that by 2025 two out of three people will be living in conditions of water stress, and 1.8 billion people will be living in regions of absolute water scarcity’ (Parr, 2013: 53). If we also consider how climate change is changing the hydrologic cycle it is unsurprising that competition over water resources is mounting. This situation has spurred on a burgeoning water market, resulting in the privatization of water resources and unlikely marriages between the public and private sector to form. Water scarcity, when combined with extreme weather events and changing seasonal patterns also impacts food production. The solution to this has been the widespread industrialization of food production which I explain has led to a growing market in patenting indigenous ecological knowledge, seeds, and the violent exploitation of animal reproductive systems and immigrant labor. Using the logic of neoliberalism to ‘solve’ the crisis climate change poses is not a solution it is a displacement activity. And as the final chapter argues, this displacement activity is an act of violence that conceals a deeper structural violence, or what Zizek would call the ‘objective violence’, of global capitalism (Zizek, 2010) such that the political weight of the problem is no longer felt. Critically engaging with this structure of objective violence is a necessary first step in creating emancipatory solutions and engaging new political subjectivities. Some reviewers have disputed the book for lacking concrete solutions (Stoekl, 2013; Pearse, 2014). Others regard my conclusions as pessimistic (Cuomo and Schueneman, 2013: 699), stating the message I leave a reader with is one of general futility (Miller, 2013: 1). I understand the criticism but I would disagree adding that I tackle the nihilistic condition of climate change politics describing how it empties the political promise of futurity out of climate change discourse. What is nihilistic, in my view, is presenting a neoliberal worldview as a universal instead of appreciating it is merely a construction and as such it is refutable. Recognizing this, describing how it works, and understanding its contingent character is for me a political strategy. Allan Stoekl asks ‘If we are to do away with consumerist individualism’ then, ‘what, in practice, will replace it?’ (Stoekl, 2013: 4). I am coming at this issue from a slightly different vantage point. Instead of hoping to eliminate consumerist individualism, I am more interested in the machinic problem of how consumerist individualism works. This point is indebted to Deleuze and Guattari’s analysis of desire as social. As I see it, we need to first recognize that individualism as expressed through consumption is just one kind of investment human energies and affects can take. This point is at the core of my analysis of sustainability culture in Hijacking Sustainability (Parr, 2009). The observation has concrete political consequences for it means energies and affects can be re-directed away from individual consumption and find investment in more emancipatory outcomes. Consumerist individualism is therefore not inevitable; it can be countered, but only if we first grasp how it works. Stoekl goes on to inquire what kind of government, ‘elected by whom, and with what (and whose) money’ could successfully realize a sustainable project (Stoekl, 2013: 4). His query echoes a similar question raised by Rebecca Pearse who writes, ‘How to turn a sense of humanity’s complicity with violence of capital into political practice is less clear.’ (Pearse, 2014: 133). Likewise Ryder W. Miller recognizes the book’s call to ‘carry on’, yet without presenting ‘many new options or ideas’ (Miller (2013): 1). I do outline an alternative approach to governance, recognizing that often this issue is presented as having either a vertical orientation (State or corporate governance) or one that is constituted as a horizontal mass movement (grassroots organization, local initiatives). I suggest a more collaborative and equitable governance structure might emerge from a transversal operation, whereby the horizontal and vertical dialectically engage each other. Whilst I acknowledge the importance of presenting concrete solutions that governments, people, and entrepreneurs can A. Parr / Geoforum 62 (2015) 70–72 71 implement, the point I make is that if politics remains at the level of neoliberal outcomes this presumes solutions to the problems climate change poses are properly the province of capital accumulation. In my view, this is not a solution it is an act of bad faith. Under such circumstances climate change politics is neutralized and is even reduced to a mere banality, because it is stripped of its transformative potential. Solving the climate change puzzle cannot be achieved under the rubric of neoliberalism because this occurs at the expense of an emancipatory project. Life will never be sustainable if the structural violence of capital accumulation continues unchecked. This distinction is ultimately an intellectual problem concerning understanding. What I set out to do is expand the reader’s understanding of how neoliberalism has become the standard against which all social, economic, cultural, and political responses to climate change are measured. Solutions are constructions and currently these primarily take place within a neoliberal frame. In my view this is lazy thinking and it has produced a narrow, even ignorant view of what opportunity consists of. The opportunity climate change presents is primarily valued as an instrument of privatization, individualism, consumption, commodification, and capital accumulation. The Wrath of Capital critiques this kind of reductive thinking explaining it arises when the practices of climate change politics are disaggregated from gender, racism, class relations, speciesism, and sexuality. If we widen the lens of climate change analysis to include the forces of exploitation, oppression, and inequity then we allow deeper ontological problems to surface. Thinking about these issues within the context of climate change discourse is a political strategy because it shifts the priorities away from capital accumulation and onto advancing the social good. All in all The Wrath of Capital identifies the myriad ways in which climate change politics has gained traction, however, I go on to consider how the logic of neoliberalism infects the potential political opportunity climate change presents. As neoliberalism enters the arenas of climate change discourse, policy, debate, and solutions – economic growth, population growth, food and water scarcity, spectacle – the transformative political opportunity is hollowed out. So yes, I do end with a desperate plea announcing all roads currently lead us through the gates of capitalist heaven. However, this is only true if our politics ignores the emancipatory promise of political change and continues on its current neoliberal trajectory. Under this schema the opportunity in question merely constructs passive subjectivities that are circumscribed by the inevitability of a neoliberal future. I maintain this is only inevitable as long as the neoliberal inscription of all spaces for all times remain closed to critique.

#### The alternative is to build solidarity around a mass socialist movement.

Mark Dudzic & Adoplh Reed 15. \*National Organizer and Chairman of the United States Labor Party. \*\*Professor of political science at the University of Pennsylvania, “THE CRISIS OF LABOUR AND THE LEFT IN THE UNITED STATES,” p. 364-367, Socialist Register, https://socialistregister.com/index.php/srv/article/view/22109.

This does not mean that those who embrace a transformative vision must abandon all hope. Rather, the priorities, activities and resources of those who would rebuild a real left must be informed by this strategic sensibility. Building or rebuilding an effective left presence will be quite likely a decades-long process. This means that we are not well served by clambering after the Next Big Thing. We must start by excising the impulse – quite understandable for a political movement devoid of any real agency – toward utopian dreaming and wishful thinking. The spark will not ignite the prairie fire. Nor will the Ark float on its own account no matter how carefully we construct it. Recognizing the left’s political irrelevance can be emancipating, as it reduces the sense of urgency to try to mobilize around every one of neoliberalism’s daily outrages. That should provide space for serious strategic discussion of how to begin to build a mass socialist movement based in the working class and the creation of new institutions capable of mobilizing cross-class solidarity, as Sam Gindin has articulated in a particularly clear and compelling way.25 Certainly, the US left could benefit from a nonsectarian, organized force with a coherent strategic vision and programme. The absence of a disciplined, unified and sophisticated group of cadre is a major source of the left’s incoherence, and helps explain why moments of spontaneous political upsurge have had, at best, an episodic impact and remain unconnected to similar moments in the past – even those in which the same activists have participated. Such organization, however, cannot be created in a vacuum. It can only emerge in tandem with a growing working-class movement. We fear that in the specific context of US history and practice, the socialist project is too narrow a platform from which to launch a broad and far ranging left revitalization. Socialist practice in the US has become the domain of sectarian groups that drive away working-class support, and socialist consciousness has not embedded itself in any significant sections of the working class or a left capable of exercising social power. That failing reflects the cultural and ideological triumph of neoliberalism and the identitarian ideologies and programmes that serve as its left wing. In this environment, building socialism is exclusively a project of cadre development, albeit one that cannot hope to succeed apart from broader movement-building. Broad movement-building requires mobilizing around an agenda of substantively anti-capitalist reforms that directly and militantly assert the priority of social needs over market forces, bourgeois property rights and managerial prerogative in the workplace and production process. Struggles to preserve and expand public institutions and to decommoditize basic human needs like housing, transportation, healthcare and education could begin to address the immediate challenge, which is to create a new popular constituency for a revitalized movement, instead of reorganizing or re-mobilizing an already existing but totally marginalized left.26 Some question whether the current US labour movement is too narrow a platform on which to rebuild a left. In a widely circulated article, ‘Fortress Unionism’, Rich Yeselson correctly highlights the atrophy of the labour movement and shows how its decline began with the passage of the TaftHartley Act in 1947. He contends that labour’s ‘current institutional expression cannot, via a creative conceptual breakthrough (“tactics or broader strategy”), engender a vast growth in union strength comparable to its former peak. In short, “organized labor” can no longer create a space for workers to join their organizations by the millions’.27 In grim statistical detail, Jake Rosenfeld’s What Unions No Longer Do gives fuel to this thesis. He points out that despite decades of exemplary, heroic and pioneering organizing by Justice for Janitors in the immigrant community, ‘Today only one in seven Hispanic janitors in the United States belongs to a union, down from one in five back in 1988, when Justice for Janitors began’.28 Yeselson calls for a ‘fortress unionism’ that would ‘defend the remaining high-density regions, sectors and companies’ and then ‘Wait for the workers to say they have had enough. When they demand in vast numbers collective solutions to their problems, seize upon that energy and institutionalize it.’29 This approach correctly identifies the urgent need to preserve the remnants of the current labour movement as an institutional base upon which to build a future revitalized movement. And it also correctly points out the haplessness of willy-nilly organizing schemes that do little to build power for working people while exposing their best leaders in unorganized workplaces to massive employer retaliation without any ability to defend them. But a strategy of waiting for workers to say they have had enough ultimately relies on magical thinking not unlike that of isolated Japanese soldiers scattered on island outposts at the end of the Second World War waiting for reinforcements from a defeated empire. Many of Yeselson’s critics, however, are equally quixotic. Bruce Raynor and Andy Stern, two of the most cynical practitioners of a unionism that disempowers workers and is based on a model of global class collaboration, point out that the ‘fortress’ strategy will do little to reduce inequality. Instead, they place their hopes in ‘strategic alliances with willing employers’; in unions developing value-added services to complement human resource departments; and in leveraging union and public-sector pension funds to rebuild union density.30 This strategy would liquidate the very concept of an independent labour movement. Given its decimation and marginalization, any revitalization movement would need to be built from a base that is far broader than the current institutional labour movement. A revitalized labour movement will have to embrace new organizational forms and some of the models emerging from new labour organizing show significant potential. Some are driven by necessity as the legal status of many immigrants and of workers in industries such as trucking, taxi driving and residential construction make organizing under current labour law virtually illegal. Much of this new organizing is being done by Worker Centers with heavy foundation funding and has the character of social work along the settlement house model of the early twentieth century. Much of it seems also, more or less openly, to fold class analysis into identitarian discourses that both substitute moralizing for political critique and fit comfortably within the NGO model. Such impulses, as well as the popularity of neologism, underlie arguments that current conditions have generated a new social formation, a ‘precariat’ that lies outside the traditional capitalist class structure.31 But some associated with this category have begun to evolve into substantial, self-conscious worker-run organizations. The Taxi Workers Alliance grew from a small New York City advocacy group to become a national organization (whose members are classified as ‘independent contractors’ and thus ineligible for union representation under US labour law) and was recently admitted to the AFL-CIO.32 In Vermont and elsewhere, strategic Workers Centers have built organic alliances with the labour movement and gone on to lead significant campaigns for healthcare for all, paid sick days and economic justice through the mobilization of a working-class constituency.33 Some argue that these campaigns and projects have the capacity to coalesce into geographically based class-conscious organizations and have called for the building of worker assemblies to give voice to this new movement.34 Such an effort would require a level of ideological sophistication and institutional independence that does not currently exist. Attempts to establish these structures on the ground have been premature and could actually inhibit the kind of broad, class-based organizing that inspires this movement in much the same way that many Labor Party chapters became captured by an ‘activistist’ mentality that focused more on preaching to the converted than building a constituency, while driving away real working-class voices who represented something more than themselves. New models are most successful when they can leverage existing organization and power to build outwards into new organization. Recent experiences organizing healthcare and homecare workers, hotel and casino workers and building services employees are fruitful examples of smart and strategic organizing that have leveraged existing union relationships and/ or political opportunities to build power for working people. We also look to the logistics organizing campaigns – which focus on the chokepoints of global capitalism and build on existing union power on the docks and other shipping centres – as having the potential to develop a particularly powerful form of a strategic union presence in economic sectors at the very core of contemporary capitalism.35

### 1NC

Dissonance PIC

#### We advocate for the entirety of the 1AC sans its theorization of ‘uncontainable dissonance.’

#### That has neither empirical support NOR a cogent definition. BUT, it permits violence that turns AND outweighs the AFF.

---BET = Basic Emotion Theory.

Ruth Leys 21, Department of Comparative Thought and Literature, School of Arts and Sciences, Johns Hopkins University, "The Trouble with Affect," History of Psychology, Vol. 24, Issue 2, May 2021, Ovid.

In spite of the recent explosion of interest in the emotions across so many fields in the humanities and social sciences, there has been little work on the history of scientific claims about the emotions in both their empirical and theoretical aspects. This was the task I set myself in my recent book, The Ascent of Affect: Genealogy and Critique (Leys, 2017), a close study of the history of research on the emotion sciences from the post-World War II period to the present. There, I argue that the fundamental problem facing the emotion field has been the perceived difficulty of simultaneously acknowledging the intentionality of the emotions, which is to say, the idea that our emotions have meaning because they are about objects in the world, and accounting for emotions in nonhuman animals, which lack the cognitive or conceptual capacities on which the intentionality of the emotions has been seen to depend.

The most influential modern solution to this problem has been the nonintentionalist position associated with the work of the psychologists Silvan Tomkins (1962, 1963) and especially his follower Paul Ekman (1972), who in the 1970s formulated the “basic emotion theory” (known in the emotion sciences as BET). According to BET, there exists a small number of basic emotions, defined as pancultural categories or “natural kinds.” Those basic emotions, which minimally include fear, anger, sadness, disgust, joy, and surprise, are considered to be evolved, genetically hard-wired, reflex-like responses of the organism that manifest themselves in signature physiological changes and patterns of behavior, especially in characteristic facial expressions. Tomkins and Ekman have proposed that the basic emotions are linked to specific neural substrates or “affect programs” located subcortically in the brain. In Ekman’s “neurocultural” version of BET, the basic emotions may be modulated or disguised by cultural norms or conventions, which he termed “display rules,” governing how we control and manage our emotions in public, or they may be masked by an attempt at deliberate deception. Outside of these cases, the face involuntarily “expresses” the affects, with the expressions acting as authentic “readouts” of discrete, internal emotional states. As such, they are context-free signals that automatically and unintentionally express affects to others. Ekman (1985) has also provided an explanation of lying according to which what is hidden in deception is detectable through the “leakage” of unmanaged involuntary emotional behavior.

An important feature of BET is the assumption that affect programs instantaneously communicate and spread emotions among members of the species or group. According to Ekman, facial expressions and other nonverbal signs of emotion have evolved precisely for that purpose. Thus, the affective meaning of facial displays is perceived directly, requiring no cognitive mediation at all by receivers. On this view, as long as displays are spontaneous, receivers have access to the emotional state of the sender that is immediate and knowing but unthinking. For such theorists, the fact that the emotional states of individuals can so readily ricochet off each other serves the purpose of establishing and securing social cooperation. Ekman has backed up these claims with numerous experiments, some of which have acquired iconic status.

In the course of researching my book, I became convinced that BET was erroneous. I doubted the validity of both the experiments and the conceptual framework employed in its support. I was also persuaded that there was something undeniably right about the opposing intentionalist position but recognized the sheer difficulty psychologists have had up to the present day in operationalizing and theorizing intentionalist views. My purpose became to track the vicissitudes and conflicts between the nonintentionalist and the intentionalist positions.

I was fortunate that in 2005, at a crucial moment in my research, I stumbled on the work of psychologist Alan Fridlund (1994), a former student of Ekman’s, who had abandoned his previous commitments and, in the book Human Facial Expression: An Evolutionary View, had offered a brilliant critique of Ekman’s BET. In opposition to BET, Fridlund did not posit the existence of a set of discrete emotions or affect programs that leak out in distinct facial expressions, adequate evidence for which he rightly argued was highly problematic. Instead, he emphasized the intentional, strategic nature of facial and other displays and in the process called into question the validity of the entire affect program theory. He argued that signals do not evolve to provide information detrimental to the signaler. “Displayers must not signal automatically, but only when it is beneficial to do so. Automatic readouts (i.e., ‘facial expressions of emotion’) would be extinguished early in phylogeny in the service of deception, economy, and privacy” (pp. 131–312).

From this, it followed that facial displays couldn’t be regarded as readouts of internal affective states but rather as intentional movements serving various social motives. As Fridlund (1994) argued, such displays would be responsive to immediate elicitors, sensitive to others who are present, one’s aims toward them, and the nature and context of the interaction. On the basis of these and related considerations, Fridlund rejected the idea of distinct emotion categories or affect programs of the kind posited by Tomkins and Ekman. He called his position a “behavioral ecology view” to acknowledge the ethological–communicative views of animal signaling that had shaped his ideas. Since 1994, his position has received support from a several scientists who, in my opinion, have persuasively shown that the evidence in favor of BET is indeed inadequate and that its theoretical rationale cannot be sustained (for example, see Russell & Fernández-Dols, 1997).

Nevertheless, it has been extraordinarily difficult for most scientists to give up Ekman’s approach to the emotions. There are several reasons for its continued success, such as (a) the theory appeals to certain intuitions about the nature of the self and authenticity that are deeply rooted in Western thought; (b) Ekman’s methods of deploying standardized photographs of posed facial expressions as stimuli in experiments on the emotions are so useful that even his critics continue to use them; (c) BET is congruent with evolutionary theories of mind; (d) its image-based approach to the emotions is also compatible with influential neuroimaging technologies, such as positron emission topography and functional MRI; and (e) BET promises to be of use to surveillance experts keen to discover methods of detecting liars. In fact, Ekman’s views have informed an enormously expensive, federally funded facial detection programs at U.S. airports designed to catch would-be terrorists before they can act—although there is no evidence that such programs are effective.

I observed earlier that I was fortunate to come across Fridlund’s work. The fact is, his objections to BET had been so largely ignored by an emotion science field so committed to maintaining the status quo that by 2005, when I first contacted him, only a handful of researchers had bothered to acknowledge his book, let alone engage with his arguments. So it took me a while to find my way to his contributions. The outcome of my encounter with Fridlund has been an enormously stimulating and, I like to think, a mutually productive intellectual friendship. So I definitely think collaboration—or perhaps in this case, “intense intellectual exchange” is a better description—is possible between scientists and historians. But I also believe such interactions can only be successful if there are sufficient shared assumptions or commitments on which the participants can build. Otherwise, it is all too easy to become bogged down in mutual incomprehension. Moreover, in my opinion, these kinds of intellectual exchange can only evolve naturally out of the interests of the individuals themselves. They cannot be mandated from above, however attractive the idea of interdisciplinarity is to university administrators.

One of the things I have learned from my studies of the postwar history of approaches to the emotions is that, in the hands of many scientists, the concept of emotion has become so nebulous as to be almost useless for the purposes of scientific research. This is Fridlund’s view. His fundamental objection to the term emotion is that when it is used according to the demands of BET or related scientific projects, it has become so ineffable as to make dealing with it a form of shadowboxing. In the absence of strict criteria determining what the term includes and what it excludes, the term emotion lacks a clear meaning. I think he is right about this, and the details of the argument can be found in my book.

But note that I say this as a historian whose job, as I see it, is not to try and come up with her own theory or definition of emotion, but to trace the history of what scientists (and philosophers) have had to say on the topic. I do not feel I have any obligation to define emotion as such, except to propose that there is something undeniably right and important in the proposal that they are intentional states.

As for the future direction of emotion studies, my main concern is not with overlooked fields but with the already existing and still rapidly expanding body of work on affect in cultural and social studies. This work is very popular but seems to me hopelessly misguided. In an article from 2011 (Leys, 2011), and in a slightly revised version of that article in a chapter of my book (Leys, 2017), I discussed this recent turn to affect in the humanities and social sciences. I suggested that, in spite of the disparate lines of thought that have influenced the contemporary general turn to affect, including on the one hand the scientific research of Tomkins and Ekman, and on the other hand the alleged “positions” of Bergson (1911/1998), Deleuze (2002), Spinoza (1996), and other philosophers, the new affect theorists all share one commitment: to nonintentionalism. They all argue that the role of rationality in human affairs has been exaggerated and that instead much more attention needs to be paid to the role of affect, defined as a subpersonal “intensity” that is independent of reason and cognition.

The trouble with these ideas is that they encourage theorists to view political and cultural life as swayed by affective forces that have nothing to do with cognition or meaning but influence human behavior unconsciously in ways that are intrinsically independent of our beliefs and control. For them, what counts in our experience of affects and emotions is not our conscious (or unconscious) intentions toward some object, but rather our subjective feelings in all their differences from those of others. Personal differences trump disagreements over ideology, because what matters is what each us feels in all our differences from each other. The result is that when people have different affective responses, they do not disagree, they just are different. From this point of view, preferring democracy to, say, totalitarianism is not a matter of espousing a normative value but simply a matter of personal taste or preference. Similarly, what political activists who adopt this view of affect seek to do is to subliminally influence or manipulate others, through the use of images or other tactics, into sharing their likings while remaining pluralistically open to the idea that different persons may simply have different inclinations. The fact that so many scholars are attracted to these ideas must be telling us something important about our culture at the moment, although they seem to me to be very unwise.

### 1NC

Psychoanalysis K

#### The 1AC’s resistance is a mode of desire that resists a master, without resisting mastery, and thus subscribes to a futile BUT nonetheless teleological project of overcoming the lack.

**Rogers 15**. Juliet Brough Rogers, professor of political science at the University of Melbourne (Australia), “A Stranger Politics: Resistance in Psychoanalytic Thought and Praxis” in Jacques Lacan: Between Psychoanalysis and Politics, Routledge, 2015: 186

The conundrum of change in psychoanalysis (and beyond) highlights the first of two particular problems of, and with, resistance that appear when the subject attempts such a change of rules. First, change rarely (if ever) involves the creation of what Douzinas (2013: 141) calls ‘a new political subject’. That is, subjects are always already subjected – let us say occupied – a priori and thus all imaginations of resistance are framed in a priori discourse. As such, the subjects’ imaginations, including their imaginations of the results of revolution – or of a new mode of being – are always colonized with what is available to them. This is why – for Žižek (2007) and for Lacan (2007) – in post-revolutionary states, what the subject will get is more of the same. The second problematic that haunts acts of resistance, and of more specific concern to psychoanalytic practice, is that any employment of violence as a means to an end, and particularly as an effort toward a violent unsettling of the regime, can only be understood as the effort to capture a definitive answer to the insistent and formative question to the Other, expressed by Lacan (2006) as,‘che vuoi Autre?’ – ‘what do you want from me?’ In some cases this may be a violent effort toward capture, exercised to the point of a defiance of the existence of the question. What this means is that one acts, violently, in order to produce a known future, as the answer. The two problematics of resistance overlap because the answer is always imagined in the terms/signifiers available from the past. That is, the answer appears in the frame of the categories which produce the subject, and thus recruits the first problematic: ‘you are (always) already subjected’. I’ll tackle these problematics in turn. First, ‘you are already subjected’. If we even partially accept Judith Butler’s (1997: 6) treatise on the formation of subjectivity as a series of ‘passionate attachments’ to ‘subjection’,10 then it is difficult to understand how the subject might be what Douzinas (2014) described as ‘re- or de-subjectivised’ in the first site of becoming a resisting subject.11 For the political subject of democracy, recognition is, as Claude Lefort (1989) has told us well, the condition of being a subject. This means recognition within the signifiers – let us call them biopolitical categories – allocated to the identity of the subject of democracy. The stage of political recognition is populated by signifiers which broker little dissent – by others and even by the self. In Butler’s terms, we are ‘passionately attached’ to our gender, imaginations of health, rights, and, in Lacan’s terms, the ‘goods’ – as objects and as ideas – which offer us the imagination of recognition. We are occupied as subjects through our own occupation with a recognizable identity before democracy, with the qualities (objects) that reflect that identity. This occupation allows for little, if any, dissent as to the naturalness, goodness, and reality of the signifiers that produce the subject – as signifiers which adhere fundamentally to economies of desires: as desires for recognition of identity and rights, as desires for capital. That is, the subject is occupied a priori with these categories and recognizes (and demands recognition) via these categories. If we accept the premises of subjection framed above then the argument follows that the resisting subject is still a subject, but one who looks for recognition beyond the common political forms. That is, we can say that the resisting subject is still ‘passionately attached’ to the ideas and objects which offer recognition, but these may be recognition by an alternative political party, a Cause or, in Lacanian psy- choanalysis, we would say s/he attaches to (another) Master’s discourse. They may resist one Master, but they chose another Master. They do not resist mastery. And here we have the basic difficulty with theories and actions of resistance. These difficulties are that somehow, in some way, any acts of resistance always become modes of, in Lacan’s terms, the desire for (another) Master (2007). Resistance, understood this way, is a state of being that is always already subjectivized within the parameters of its own claims, or within the parameters of the subject’s imagination of its goals. This is the obvious reference made by Lacan in his comments to the students who participated in the ‘resistances’ of 1968 in France (and elsewhere). As he says, ‘What you aspire to as revolutionaries is a Master. You will get one’ (Lacan 2007: 207).14 The provocative comment to the students – some of whom have come to listen to him and some who have come to (apparently) resist him – is a comment on their acting out the discourse of the Master that they imagine they can overcome, through listening (or even objecting) to another Master, namely, Lacan. In this attempt at resistance which falls prey to its own conditions of subjection, we can say that the subjectivity of the resisting subject – the student – is preoccupied with the signifiers available to resist, where the best they can hope for is to be re-occupied by the imagination of securing (another) truth. This hope, at least for the students in France at this time – understood through Lacan (and his discussions in 1969) – is the hope for the Other’s knowledge. A knowledge which the subject presumes the Other has. A knowledge which is imagined to be able to be accessed and had. A knowledge which is presented as the answer to the question ‘che vois Autre?’ And here appears the second psychoanalytic concern with resistance: resistance as a belief in an access to an answer, or, in its most extreme or crude terms, resistance as psychosis. Resistance, understood as a desire for a Master, becomes a performance of what the subject imagines is the answer. The answer as a closed course of action with a fixed teleological imagination, such that the resisting subject might say: ‘If I do this I will be this’, or ‘if I do this then the final result will be this’, or, in its psychotic form, ‘if I do this the world will be this’. It is important to stress, however, that this may not follow for all acts of resistance – which I will postulate later – but when Lacan says of the students in France that what they want is a Master, this form of psychotic achievement of an answer is precisely what he is referring to. Theirs is the desire for a discourse that holds within it the knowledge that the subject imagines is required (and can be acquired/obtained/had) to achieve a perfection of the signifier, an imagination that the subject can acquire, what Lacan (2007: 14–15) describes as the ‘Other’s jouissance’. The students, in Lacan’s suggestion, want to resist in order to obtain the answer when it is the existence of an answer at all they are supposedly resisting.

#### The alternative is to adopt the role of the analyst---instead of asking what the NEG should do, you should limit your decision to what the AFF should do differently. Voting NEG is not a matter of saying yes or no to the AFF, but a matter of analyzing the psychological investment that the AFF has in the politics of the status quo, and their attendant structures of exclusion and depoliticization. Only by interrupting the fantasies of the 1AC can we clear the way for actual political change.

Bracher 94. Mark, Professor in English Department @ Kent State U., “On the Psychological and Social Functions of Language: Lacan's Theory of the Four Discourses,” *Lacanian Theory of Discourse: Subject, Structure, and Society*, ed. Mark Bracher et al, pp. 123-128

The Discourse of the Analyst It is thus **the discourse of the Analyst** that, according to Lacan, **offers the only ultimately effective means of countering the psychological and social tyranny** exercised through language. It does so because it puts receivers of its message in the position of assuming and enacting the $—that is, their own alienation, anxiety, shame, desire, symptom—and of responding to this $ by producing new master signifiers (5,), ultimate values, formulations of their identity or being: a —> $ — — S2 S1 Such production does not constitute a radical break with tyranny and an accession to freedom, for the subject remains in thrall to a master signifier. This means that what is produced in the discourse of the Analyst is another discourse of the Master, thus rendering the process circular rather than progressive. There is a crucial difference, however, in this new discourse of the Master: its master signifiers are produced by the subject rather than imposed upon the subject from the outside. In this way one "shifts gears," as Lacan puts it. The analytic discourse, that is, makes it possible to produce a master signifier that is a little less oppressive, because it is of a different style (205), a style that, we might surmise, is less absolute, exclusive, and rigid in its establishment of the subject's identity, and more open, fluid, processual-constituted, in a word, by relativity and textuality. The discourse of the Analyst is able to promote such a response and production **because it is opposed to all will of mastery** (79), engaging in a continuous flight from meaning and closure, in a displacement that never ceases (171) (which does not mean, however, that the analysand never reaches any kind of closure). The discourse of the Analyst does this by placing in the dominant position the a, precisely what has been excluded from symbolization (48) and suppressed by the discourse of the Master. The analyst, that is, works first to elicit from the patient a discourse with a hysterical structure (35-36), that is, a discourse in which the alienated subject – the subject of shame, anxiety, meaningless, or desire-is revealed. This manifestation of the divided subject occurs not only in the thematic content of the patient's discourse –that is, in confessions about desire, frustration, anxiety, shame, or other symptoms – but also in the style of the patient's speech, that is, in the particu lar nature of the images, the syntax, the self-reference, and the other reference employed by the patient, and also in whatever ellipses and parapraxias might occur. The analyst responds to this hysterical discourse of the patient in such a way as to illuminate and emphasize what has been left out, repressed-that is, the a. This response of the analyst may not involve any explicit interpretation at all; it may consist simply in a punctuation of the patient's speech produced by ending the session or uttering an exclamation at a particular point in the patient's speech. Or it may occur as the forebearance of naming-as the silent witness that the analyst bears to the patient's speech and to the transference elicited by the fact that the patient supposes the analyst to have knowl edge of why the patient suffers, what the patient desires, and what will answer to this suffering and/or desire. Whatever the specific response of the analyst, it is efficacious to the extent that it represents to the patient the effect of what has been left out of discourse-that is, the a (48), the cause of the patient's desire (205). It is being confronted with this rejected element that produces the depth and intensity of self-division or alienation necessary for patients to want to separate themselves from some of the alienating master signifers (which embody these patients' symbolic identifications) and produce new master signifiers—identifications that are less exclusive, restrictive, and conflictual. The analyst's activity of interpretation-that is, of representing the a, cause of the patient's desire-is sustained by the analyst's implicit knowledge, S2, in the place of truth. This knowledge, Lacan says, can be either the analyst's already acquired knowledge (38)-for example, of the Oedipus complex (113) -which functions as the basis of analytic sallior-faire, or it may be knowledge acquired from listening to the analysand (38)-that is, specific knowledge of the analysand's particular psychic economy and of the nature of the analysand's a. In either case, this knowledge is very different from those found in the discourses of the University and of the Master. It is what Lacan calls a mythic knowledge. While the knowledge of Master and University discourses-or mathematical knowledge, as Lacan characterizes it-emphasizes identities as absolute and self-referential, mythic knowledge emphasizes relationships (102-4). Logical, mathematical knowledge thus forms a completely coherent but static, tautological (i.e., self-referential, self-enclosed) system, and it is precisely such a knowledge/system that, rejecting truth as dynamic, produces the a. Mythic knowledge, on the other hand-that is, the form of the knowledge that constitutes the truth of the discourse of the Analyst, and is repressed by the patient-is a disjoint knowledge, a form that is completely alien to the discourse of science (103-4). In the mythic knowledge of the discourse of the Analyst, that is, "the truth only shows itself in an alternation of things that are strictly opposed, which it is necessary to make turn around each other" (127). It is only the mythic form of knowledge that can avoid excluding the a, because it offers not absolute, clearly established, selfreferential identities, but rather a system of oppositions embodied in images and fantasies that offer no unequivocal identities, meanings, or values. It is this basis in the mythic, unconscious knowledge that allows the enactor of the discourse of the Analyst to discover and express the a, cause of desire, to which this knowledge bears mute witness. And this position of the analyst, Lacan indicates, **can be taken up with regard not only to individual subjects but also in relation to society as a whole.** Taking up such a position provides **the only real chance**, in Lacan's view, **to produce a real revolution in relation to the discourse of the Master. The best thing to do to bring about revolution is to be not anarchists but analysts**, Lacan says. Operating from the position of an analyst with regard to culture means reading the various, mutually disjoint and even contradictory discourses of a culture **in order to reveal the** a, **unconscious fantasy, cause of desire, which operates from behind the facade of the master signifiers and the entire signifying apparatus**. By exposing the real that the system of signifiers, and particularly the master signifiers, fail to grasp, one can interpellate subjects to **an activation of their alienated condition, their non identity with their master signifiers**, and thus create an impetus for the production of new master signifiers. What must be done, essentially, is **to reveal to the subjects of a society that what they are asking for** (and perhaps think they are getting) **in their** values, ideals, **conscious desires**, and identifications **is not the only expression or even the most truthful embodiment of what they really want**-that what they really want is not, per se, the actualization of a particular ideal, the satisfaction of a specific desire, the realization of a certain identity, or the establishment of a given value, **but rather the enactment of a particular fantasy**, which ultimately means occupying a particular position as object of the Other's desire and jouissance. The Uses of Lacan's Schema of Discourse The value of Lacan's theory of the four discourses should be evident. Its greatest contribution should be in the area of ideology critique or cultural criticism, for **more than any other** rhetorical **theory, Lacan's model provides the means for explaining how a given text moves people**. One reason it is able to surpass other approaches on this score is that its formulation of four cardinal factors of discourse-knowledge-system, master signifier, alienated subject, and remainder-unites psychic structure, the ground of motivation, with semiotic phenomena and discursive structure in a single model. This synthesis allows for an analysis of discourse that views every linguistic and discursive phenomenon in terms of the role it might play in the full range of psychological and social functions and structures that underlie human motivation on various planes-including identity, identification, ideals, values, alienation, anxiety, shame, desire, and fantasy. A second advantage of Lacan's model is its rigorously dialogical structure, which establishes definite, determinative links between the dominant and subordinate linguistic-psychological factors of the sender of a message and the dominant and subordinate factors that a given discourse summons forth in the receiver. In prompting us to identify the dominant element in a discourse (S2, S1, $, or a), Lacan's model immediately tells us where to look for (1) the repressed factor in the sender of the discourse and (2) **the elements that the receivers of the discourse are called upon** (a) **to assume or enact and** (b) **to produce**. In short, Lacan's theory can provide the means of determining the dialogical discursive Structure of any given speech act, text, or discourse, and on that basis, the means for gauging the psychological and (thereby) social-political functions it might serve for its producers, as well as the psychological and (thereby) social-political impact it might have on various types of receiving subjects. In doing this, **Lacan's schema not only allows us to expose the ideological force of a discourse; it also puts us in a position to intervene more effectively either to counter or to promote that force.** The implications for the study of discourse are thus profound and wide ranging. Lacan's model offers the means for a clearer understanding, for example, of how sermons and political speeches can stir some people to a frenzy and even change radically their behavior, or, conversely, leave people unmoved. Lacan's model can guide the way to a clearer understanding of how the discourses of science (physical and social) work to reinforce a sense of identity and security or, conversely, induce a state of anxiety. It can help us understand how education works, and why it often doesn't, at least not in the intended manner. In brief, Lacan's schema of discourse puts us in a position both to understand and to alter the effects not only of obviously moving, hortatory forms of discourse, such as sermons, political speeches, and other forms of propaganda, but also the more expository (and often seemingly objec tive) discourses of science, history, and biography. In doing so, **Lacan's schema offers us a basis for making some crucial** distinctions and **interventions** in what still remains, for rhetoricians as well as the general populace, the largely amorphous and invisible sea of discourse in which we spend most of our days swimming blindly, carried along by massive currents of which we are ignorant.

### 1NC

Antitrust CP

#### The United States federal government should:

#### ---establish a structural presumption against all antitrust relevant economic activity;

#### ---prohibit anticompetitive private sector business practices by the American Debate Association, National Debate Tournament, and Cross-Examination Debate Association by expanding the scope of its core antitrust laws to include the lack of adaptation to include hybrid debaters.

## Case

### Top---1NC

#### Role of the judge: vote based on who did the better debating. It’s the only non-arbitrary metric of adjudication. VI for clash AND fairness.

#### That solves their offense---results in developing best strategies for combatting violence against hybrid teams.

### AT: Fungibility---1NC

#### Your ballot is not a referendum altering hybrid rules---that makes debate an impossible game where 1AC’s criticize rules, and you are forced to vote for them because of problems disconnected from the process of affirmation and negation.

#### There are plenty of better remedies---Facebook groups, changing the ADA constitution, and advocating for NDT policy changes do not require in-round energy.

#### The aff actively forecloses the opportunity to use formalized processes to change those rules---it focuses energy in the round which prevents the people that matter from hearing their case.

#### Tournaments do allow hybrid teams---CEDA and ADA are both great and allow them. The aff team themselves debated at the NDT last year!

#### Hybrid teams fail---creates higher workloads, magnifies resource struggles at colleges, and reinforces geographic inequality by making it harder for schools without others nearby to have competitive teams.

#### No auto-30s---it’s an arbitrary AND self-serving advocacy that renders objective competition meaningless. That turns AND outweighs their offense.

### AT: Futility---1NC

#### The impact is overstated---they can compete and have national success---the NDT is not key.

#### The 1AC’s value stands on its own---responding to it with judgement and the ballot is a hollow validation that siphons off political energy and draws them into the oppressive gaze of the academy---vote Negative to decline affirmation

Phillips 99 – Dr. Kendall R. Phillips, Professor of Communication at Central Missouri State University, PhD in Speech Communication from Pennsylvania State University, MA in Speech Communication from Central Missouri State University, BS in Psychology and Sociology from Southwest Baptist University, “Rhetoric, Resistance, and Criticism: A Response to Sloop and Ono”, Philosophy & Rhetoric, Volume 32, Number 1, p. 96-101

My concern with this movement centers around an issue that Sloop and Ono seem to take as a given, namely, the role of the critic. On one hand, calling for the systematic investigation of existing marginalized discourses is a natural extension both of critical rhetoric (see McKerrow 1989, 1991) and of the general ideological turn in criticism (see Wander 1983). On the other hand, the ease of transition from criticism in the service of resistance to criticism of resistance may obscure the need to address some fundamental issues regarding the general function of rhetorical criticism in an uncertain and contentious world. Beyond licensing the critic to engage in political struggle, Sloop and Ono advocate the pursuit of covert resistant discourses.

Such a move not only stretches our understanding of rhetoric and criticism, but also alters significantly the relationship between critic and out- law. Critical interrogation of dominant discursive practices in the service of political/cultural reform is supplanted in favor of positioning covert out- law communities as objects of investigation. Invited to seek out subversive discourses, the critic is positioned as the active agent of change and the out-law discourse becomes merely instrumental. Rather than academic criticism acting in service of everyday acts of resistance, everyday acts of resistance are put into the service of academic criticism.

Rhetorical resistance

That we are "caught within conflicting logics of justice that are culturally struggled over" (Sloop and Ono 1997, 50) and that rhetoric is employed in these struggles seems an uncontroversial statement. Despite the theoretical miasma surrounding judgment, Sloop and Ono accurately note, the material process of rendering judgments (and of disputing the logics of litigation) continues in the world of actually practiced discourse. In the materially contested world, rhetoric is utilized both by those seeking to secure the grounds of dominant judgment and by those seeking to undermine or supplant dominant cultural logics with some out-law notion of justice.

The distinction between these two cultural groups, "in-law" and out- law, however, deserves some consideration prior to any discussion of the role of the critic as implied in the out-law discourse project. The discourse of the dominant or those within the bounds of superordinate logics of litigation is reminiscent of Michel De Certeau's (1984) strategic discourse. For De Certeau, strategies are utilized by those who have authority by virtue of their proper position. Strategies exploit the institutionally guaranteed background consensus by which power relations (and litigations) are maintained and advanced. In contrast, tactics are utilized by those having no proper place of authority within the discursive economy who must seek opportunities whereby the discourse of the dominant might be undermined and contested. To extend Sloop and Ono's definition, out-law discourses are those that can (and, by their analysis, do) take advantage of situations (e.g., race riots) to disrupt the regularity of dominant cultural groups.

The ongoing struggle between strategically instituted cultural dominants and the "out-law always lurk[ing] in the distance" (66) is acknowledged, even celebrated, by Sloop and Ono. What their acknowledgment fails to provide, however, is a clear need for critical intervention. Indeed, quite the reverse is presented: It is the critic (particularly the left-leaning critic) who needs out-law discourse. While the struggles over justice, equality, and freedom have gone on, the left-leaning critics are those who have theoretically excluded themselves from the disputes. The study of out-law dis- courses, then, provides a means to reinvigorate the intellectual and re-institute (academic) leftist thinking into popular political struggles (53-54). Thus, Sloop and Ono's project incorporates three types of rhetoric: the rhetoric of the in-law, presumably the traditional object of critical attention; the rhetoric of the out-law, the study of which may transform our understanding of judgment as well as reinvigorate leftist democratic critiques; and the rhetoric of the critics who, having lost their political po- tency, can exploit the discourse of the out-law to promote ideological struggles. It is to this critical rhetoric that I now turn.

Resistance criticism

Sloop and Ono (1997) clearly state the relationship they envision between the rhetorical critic and out-law discourse: "Ultimately, we will argue that the role of critical rhetoricians is to produce 'materialist conceptions of judgment,' using out-law judgments to disrupt dominant logics of judgment" (54; emphasis added). Here the critic seeks out vernacular discourse (60), focuses on the methods and values embodied in these communities (62), listens to and evaluates the out-law community (62-63), and chooses appropriate discourses for the purpose of disrupting dominant practices (63). Essentially, it is the critic who seeks out marginalized discourses and returns them to the center for the purpose of provoking dominant cultural groups (63).

Despite acknowledging the efficacy of out-law discourses, Sloop and Ono assume that the critiques generated and presented by the out-law community have only minimal effect. The irony, and indeed arrogance, of this assumption is evident when they claim: "There are cases, however, when, without the prompting of academic critics, out-law discourses serve local purposes at times and at others resonate within dominant discourses, disrupting sedimented ways of thinking, transforming dominant forms of judgment" (60; emphasis added). Sloop and Ono seem to suggest that such locally generated critiques are the exception, whereas the political efficacy of the academic critic is the rule. This seems an odd claim, given that the justification for their out-law discourse project is the lack of politically viable academic critique and the perceived potency of out-law conceptions of judgment. Their suggestion that out-law communities are in need of the academic critic contradicts not only the already disruptive nature of existing out-law discourses (the grounds for using out-law discourse), but also the impotence of contemporary critical discourse (the warrant for studying out-law discourse).

By this I do not mean that the critiques and theories generated by academically instituted intellectuals have not been incorporated into subversive discourses. Just as out-law discourses inevitably mount critiques of dominant logics, so, too, the perspectives on rhetoric and criticism generated by academics are used in resistance movements. Feminist critiques of patriarchy, queer theories of homophobia, postcolonial interrogations of race have found their way into the service of resistant groups. The key distinction I wish to make is that the existence of criticism (academic or self-generated) in resistance does not necessitate Sloop and Ono's move to a criticism of resistance.

What Sloop and Ono fail to offer is an adequate argument for "taking public speaking out of the streets and studying it in the classroom, for treating it less as an expression of protest" (Wander 1983, 3) and more as an object for analysis and reproduction within the political economy of the academy. Philip Wander made a similar charge against Herbert Wicheln's early critical project, and this concern should remain at the forefront of any discussion aimed at expanding the scope and function of criticism. Sloop and Ono offer numerous directives for the critic without addressing whether the critic should be examining out-law discourses in the first place. While it is too early to suggest any definitive answer to the question of criticism of resistance, some preliminary arguments as to why critics should not pursue out-law discourses can be offered:

(1) Hidden out-law discourses may have good reasons to stay hidden. Sloop and Ono specifically instruct us that "the logic of the out-law must constantly be searched for, brought forth" (66) and used to disrupt dominant practices. But are we to believe that all out-law discourses are prepared to mount such a challenge to the dominant cultural logic? Or, indeed, that the members of out-law communities are prepared to be brought into the arena of public surveillance in the service of reconstituting logics of litigation? It seems highly unlikely that all divergent cultural groups have developed equally, or that all members of these groups share Sloop and Ono's "imperial impulse" (51) to promote their conceptions and practices of justice.

(2) Academic critical discourse is not transparent. Here I allude to the overall problem of translation (see Foucault 1994; Lyotard 1988; Lyotard and Thebaud 1985; Zabus 1995) as an extension of the previous concern. Critical discourse cannot become the medium of commensurability for divergent language games. Are we to believe that the "use" of out-law dis- course by critics to disrupt dominant practices can fail to do violence to these diverse/divergent logics? Are out-law discourses merely tools to be exploited and discarded in the pursuit of returning leftist academic dis- course to the center?

(3) Perhaps the academic translation of out-law discourse could be true to the internal logic of the out-law community. And, perhaps the re-presentation of out-law logic within the academic community will bestow a degree of legitimacy on the out-law community. Nonetheless, the effect of legitimizing out-law discourse is unknown and potentially destructive. In an effort to siphon the political energy of out-law discourse into academic practice, we may ultimately destroy the dissatisfaction that serves as a cathexis for these out-law discourses. It seems possible that academic recognition might take the place of struggle for material opportunities (see Fraser 1997). But, will academic legitimation create any material changes in the conditions of out-law communities? I mean to suggest, not that it is better to allow the out-law community to suffer for its cause, but rather that incorporating the struggle into an (admittedly) impotent academic critique does not offer a prima facie alternative.

(4) Criticism of resistance denies the practical and theoretical importance of opportunity. Returning to De Certeau's notion of tactics, the crucial element of these discursive moves is their use of opportunity to disrupt the proper authority of the dominant. The kairos of intervention provides the key to undermining "in-law" discourses. But when is the "right moment in time" for the academic reproduction of out-law discourse? Mapping the points of resistance (ala Foucault and Biesecker) entails interrogating "in-law" discourses for their incongruities and contradictions, not turning the academic gaze upon those communities waiting for an opportunity. Out-laws do not lurk in the forefront (66), hoping to be exposed by academic critics; they wait for the right moment for their disruption. Rhetoricians can provide rhetorical instructions for seeking opportunities and for exploiting these opportunities (literally making the culturally weaker argument the stronger), but this does not justify interrogating (intervening in) the cultural logics of the marginalized.

The concerns raised here are not designed to dismiss Sloop and Ono's provocative essay. The divergent critical logic they outline deserves careful consideration within the critical community, and it is my hope that the concerns I raise may help to further problematize the relationship between

resistance and rhetorical criticism.

Rhetorical criticism

As I have suggested, my purpose is to use the provocative nature of Sloop and Ono's project to extend disputes regarding the ends of rhetorical criticism. Diverging perspectives on the ends of criticism have been categorized by Barbara Warnick (1992) as falling along four general lines: artist, analyst, audience, and advocate. Leah Ceccarelli (1997) discerns similar categories around the aesthetic, epistemic, and political ends of rhetorical criticism.

The out-law discourse project presents clear ties to the notion of critic as advocate. For Sloop and Ono, the critic is an interested party, discerning (and at times disputing) the underlying values and forces contained within a discourse. Additionally, however, the out-law discourse critic is an analyst focusing on the hidden, aberrant texts of the out-law and "rendering] an incoherent or esoteric text comprehensible" (Warnick 1992, 233). Now, I am not suggesting that a critic must serve only one function or that the roles of advocate and analyst are mutually exclusive; rather, these entanglings of power (political ends) and knowledge (epistemic ends) are inevitable. My concern is that we not neglect the complexity of these entanglements. Turning covert out-law discourses into objects of our analyses runs the risk of subjecting them both to the gaze of the dominant and to the power relations of the academy. As the works of Michel Foucault (especially 1979, 1980) aptly illustrate, practices presented as extending such noble goals as emancipation and humanity may endow institutions of confinement and objectification. Any justification for studying out-law dis- course because doing so may extend our political usefulness in the pursuit of emancipatory goals must not obscure the already existing power relations authorizing such studies. Our attempts to extend our domains of knowledge and expertise (authority) must not be pursued unreflexively.

### AT: Method---1NC

#### Attempting to create community change through wins completely backfires and trades-off with other more effective avenues

Panetta 9 – Dr. Edward Panetta, Chair of the Department of Communication at the University of Georgia, and Jarrod Atchison, then Director of Debate at Trinity University, “Intercollegiate Debate and Speech Communication: Issues for the Future”, The Sage Handbook of Rhetorical Studies, Ed. Lunsford, Rosa, and Eberly, p. 317-334

Debates as Sites of Community Change

The debate community has become more self-reflexive and increasingly invested in attempting to address the problems that have plagued the community from the start. The degrees to which things are considered problems and the appropriateness of different solutions to the problems have been hotly contested, but some fundamental issues, such as diversity and accessibility, have received considerable attention in recent years. This section will address the “debate as activism” perspective that argues that the appropriate site for addressing community problems is individual debates. In contrast to the “debate as innovation” perspective, which assumes that the activity is an isolated game with educational benefits, proponents of the “debate as activism” perspective argue that individual debates have the potential to create change in the debate community and society at large. If the first approach assumed that debate was completely insulated, this perspective assumes that there is no substantive insulation between individual debates and the community at large. From our perspective, using individual debates to create community change is an insufficient strategy for three reasons. First, individual debates are, for the most part, insulated from the community at large. Second, individual debates limit the conversation to the immediate participants and the judge, excluding many important contributors to the debate community. Third, locating the discussion within the confines of a competition diminishes the additional potential for collaboration, consensus, and coalition building.

The first problem that we isolate is the difficulty of any individual debate to generate community change. Although any debate has the potential to create problems for the community (videotapes of objectionable behavior, etc.), rarely does any one debate have the power to create community-wide change. We attribute this ineffectiveness to the structural problems inherent in individual debates and the collective forgetfulness of the debate community.

The structural problems stem from the current tournament format that has remained relatively consistent for the past 30 years. Debaters engage in preliminary debates in rooms that are rarely populated by anyone other than the judge. Judges are instructed to vote for the team that does the best debating, but the ballot is rarely seen by anyone outside the tabulation room. Given the limited number of debates in which a judge actually writes meaningful comments, there is little documentation of what actually transpired during the debate round. During the period when judges interact with the debaters, there are often external pressures (filing evidence, preparing for the next debate, etc.) that restrict the ability of anyone outside the debate to pay attention to the judges’ justification for their decision. Elimination debates do not provide for a much better audience because debates still occur simultaneously, and travel schedules dictate that most of the participants have left by the later elimination rounds. It is difficult for anyone to substantiate the claim that asking a judge to vote to solve a community problem in an individual debate with so few participants is the best strategy for addressing important problems.

In addition to the structural problems, the collective forgetfulness of the debate community reduces the impact that individual debates have on the community. The debate community is largely made up of participants who debate and then move on to successful careers. The coaches and directors that make up the backbone of the community are the people with the longest cultural memory, but they are also a small minority of the community when considering the number of debaters involved in the activity. This is not meant to suggest that the activity is reinvented every year—certainly there are conventions that are passed down from coaches to debaters and from debaters to debaters. However, the basic fact remains that there are virtually no transcriptions available for the community to read, and, therefore, it is difficult to substantiate the claim that the debate community can remember any one individual debate over the course of several generations of debaters. Additionally, given the focus on competition and individual skill, the community is more likely to remember the accomplishments and talents of debaters rather than a specific winning argument. The debate community does not have the necessary components in place for a strong collective memory of individual debates. The combination of the structures of debate and the collective forgetfulness means that any strategy for creating community change that is premised on winning individual debates is less effective than seeking a larger community dialogue that is recorded and/or transcribed.

A second problem with attempting to create community change in individual debates is that the debate community is comprised of more individuals than the four debaters and one judge that are present in every round. Coaches and directors have very little space for engaging in a discussion about community issues. This is especially true for coaches and directors who are not preferred judges and, therefore, do not have access to many debates. Coaches and directors should have a public forum to engage in a community conversation with debaters instead of attempting to take on their opponents through the wins and losses of their own debaters.

In addition to coaches and debaters, there are many people who might want to contribute to a community conversation, but are not directly involved in competition. For instance, most debate tournaments take place at an academic institution that plays host to the rest of the community. For that institution to host everyone, they must make tremendous sacrifices. It would be beneficial to the debate community to have some of the administrators who make decisions about supporting debate come to a public forum and discuss what types of information they need when they make decisions about program funding. Directors and coaches would benefit from having administrators explain to the community how they evaluate the educational benefits of debate. Additionally, every institution has unique scholars who work in some area and who could be of benefit to the debate community. The input of scholars who study argument, communication, race, gender, sexuality, economics, and the various other academic interests could provide valuable advice to the debate community. For example, a business professor could suggest how to set up a collective bargaining agreement to reduce the costs associated with travel. Attempting to create an insulated community that has all the answers ignores the potential to create very powerful allies within academic institutions that could help the debate community. After all, debate is not the first community to have problems associated with finances, diversity, and competition. These resources, however, are not available for individual debates. The debate community is broader than the individual participants and can achieve better reform through public dialogue than individual debates.

The final problem with an individual debate round focus is the role of competition. Creating community change through individual debate rounds sacrifices the “community” portion of the change. Many teams that promote activist strategies in debates profess that they are more interested in creating change than winning debates. What is clear, however, is that the vast majority of teams that are not promoting community change are very interested in winning debates. The tension that is generated from the clash of these opposing forces is tremendous. Unfortunately, this is rarely a productive tension. Forcing teams to consider their purpose in debating, their style in debates, and their approach to evidence are all critical aspects of being participants in the community.

However, the dismissal of the proposed resolution that the debaters have spent countless hours preparing for, in the name of a community problem that the debaters often have little control over, does little to engender coalitions of the willing. Should a debate team lose because their director or coach has been ineffective at recruiting minority participants? Should a debate team lose because their coach or director holds political positions that are in opposition to the activist program? Competition has been a critical component of the interest in intercollegiate debate from the beginning, and it does not help further the goals of the debate community to dismiss competition in the name of community change.

The larger problem with locating the “debate as activism” perspective within the competitive framework is that it overlooks the communal nature of the community problem. If each individual debate is a decision about how the debate community should approach a problem, then the losing debaters become collateral damage in the activist strategy dedicated toward creating community change. One frustrating example of this type of argument might include a judge voting for an activist team in an effort to help them reach elimination rounds to generate a community discussion about the problem. Under this scenario, the losing team serves as a sacrificial lamb on the altar of community change. Downplaying the important role of competition and treating opponents as scapegoats for the failures of the community may increase the profile of the winning team and the community problem, but it does little to generate the critical coalitions necessary to address the community problem, because the competitive focus encourages teams to concentrate on how to beat the strategy with little regard for addressing the community problem. There is no role for competition when a judge decides that it is important to accentuate the publicity of a community problem. An extreme example might include a team arguing that their opponents’ academic institution had a legacy of civil rights abuses and that the judge should not vote for them because that would be a community endorsement of a problematic institution. This scenario is a bit more outlandish but not unreasonable if one assumes that each debate should be about what is best for promoting solutions to diversity problems in the debate community.

If the debate community is serious about generating community change, then it is more likely to occur outside a traditional competitive debate. When a team loses a debate because the judge decides that it is better for the community for the other team to win, then they have sacrificed two potential advocates for change within the community. Creating change through wins generates backlash through losses. Some proponents are comfortable with generating backlash and argue that the reaction is evidence that the issue is being discussed.

From our perspective, the discussion that results from these hostile situations is not a productive one where participants seek to work together for a common goal. Instead of giving up on hope for change and agitating for wins regardless of who is left behind, it seems more reasonable that the debate community should try the method of public argument that we teach in an effort to generate a discussion of necessary community changes. Simply put, debate competitions do not represent the best environment for community change because it is a competition for a win and only one team can win any given debate, whereas addressing systemic century-long community problems requires a tremendous effort by a great number of people.

#### Using the ballot as currency makes change in the debate community less likely by trading-off with out-of-round solutions that are more effective

Ritter 13 – Michael J. Ritter, JD from the University of Texas School of Law, with honors, BA from Trinity University, cum laude, “OVERCOMING THE FICTION OF “SOCIAL CHANGE THROUGH DEBATE”: WHAT’S TO LEARN FROM 2PAC’S CHANGES?”, National Journal of Speech & Debate, Volume II: Issue I, September, p. 32-37

The preceding discussion demonstrates why arguments about social change— even social change within the debate community—have persuasive value only outside of a debate round. The debate community has developed multiple forums in which members of the community engage in noncompetitive and, sometimes, academic debate on issues within the debate community. These include discussions before and after rounds with judges, teammates, and competitors; on forums or online message boards; or in academic publications. For the social issues external to the debate community, there are almost an unlimited number of ways that students form opinions. And, after students form their opinions and join causes and organizations, there are about an equal number of non-competitive ways that students can use techniques and modes of persuasion discussed by academics and rhetorical theories.

Debate rounds, at the very most, operate as venue solely for raising awareness about social issues and debate practices. It would be illogical to conclude that, because issues were debated in a particular debate and out-of-round discussion about that practice followed, the in-round debate created a social change. Because coaches and students strategically consider their arguments and practices prior to a debate round, the social issues or the “concern” about a debate tactic initially spawns outside of debate rounds, not from within a singular debate round. And just because one event occurred before another does not make the former the cause of the latter. To the extent that the in-round practice causes a subsequent out-of-round discussion, debate is admittedly a form for raising awareness about practices and social issues for students. But the arguments presented in the debate round will lack persuasive value in the round insofar as convincing the judge or other audience members of anything beyond the ultimate question of who did the better debating.

But even if this article’s arguments up to this point have no validity, and creating social change through debate rounds is more likely than just theoretically possible, this is insufficient to adopt the proposition that competitive interscholastic debate creates social change. It remains a fiction because no academics—not even those who have remained in the debate community for decades—have attempted to prove its validity with any form of study or survey. No studies or surveys have been conducted on any particular application of philosophical or rhetorical theory to the practices within competitive interscholastic debate. Thus, competitive interscholastic debates and meta-debates therein claiming to create some sort of change either within the community or outside the community have no empirical support. They simply present the possibility, but fail to show any probability of success. Because any critically thinking person (in or out of the debate community) should be hesitant to presume probability based on mere possibility, the probability of the general theory being applicable in the competitive interscholastic debate context should be presumed to be zero, as no probability has been proven. Although practices have certainly evolved, no empirical study has causally linked this evolution to in-round arguments to the exclusion of out-of-round, non-competitive discussions.

Why We Should Get Over This Fiction

Fictions are neither inherently good nor inherently bad. Fictions must be judged based on whether they serve some relevant purpose to the context in which the fiction is adopted. The legal fiction that all people are presumed to know the law is one such fiction. If no one follows laws, then passing laws is pointless. Therefore, compliance with the law is fundamental. The fiction that people are presumed to know the law encourages individuals to know the law and increases compliance. If individuals can shield themselves from the ramifications of violating the law by not knowing the law, people would be encouraged to avoid learning about the law to excuse or justify non-compliance.

A sound methodology for determining whether a fiction is good or bad must include: (1) an identification of whether the proposition is a fiction; (2) what the purposes of the context, field, or activity that is considering adoption of the fiction; and (3) whether the fiction advances or hinders those purposes. Up until this point, this article has argued why it is a fiction to believe that debate rounds cause social change. And, as was discussed at length in Nix the Nixonism: Identifying the Purposes of Debate by Understanding Constituency, Transparency & Accountability, the primary purposes of debate are self-preservation and “o promote skills including public speaking, researching, and critical thinking as judged by the larger academic community and the general public.29 Thus, deciding whether to dispense with the fiction of “social change through debate” is a worthwhile endeavor will require determining whether this fiction promotes or hinders the self-preservation of the community and promotes skills including public speaking, research, and critical thinking.

Although either maintaining or dispensing with the fiction would likely be neutral with respect to promoting public speaking, researching, and critical thinking skills, the fiction continues to deal damaging blows to the debate community. These damaging effects can be shown anecdotally. The fiction has damaged the legitimacy of the debate community by encouraging a race to the bottom in terms of debaters—in a competitive flurry—trying to outdo each other and themselves. The best examples of this are in college policy debate, which has existed for much longer than any other interscholastic debate format in the U.S. The development of the “kritik” opened possibilities for deployment of a new body of literature in rounds. The race to the bottom has caused the debate community’s acceptance of the following in-round tactics: stripping nude to de-mystify the female body; dance-offs; defecating into a bag to face our waste; simulating an abortion; actual in round violence between debate partners to illustrate and dramatize domestic violence; voting down white debaters because they were white in order to promote minority participation in competitive interscholastic debate; and debating with the lights off, performatively conserving energy. Those outside of the debate community in academic and professional circles have noticed this downward trend in competitive interscholastic debate. As a result of this trend, debate is currently viewed as having diminished pedagogical value in terms of public speaking, research, and critical thinking. This presents a very real threat to the existence of schools’ debate programs.30

A possible advantage of adopting the fiction is that if students believe in the persuasive power of their positions, then they would be more likely to recommunicate the message in non-competitive formats outside of the competitive interscholastic debate community. Not only has this argument been empirically disproven, the opposite has proven to be true. Most debaters are involved in few, if any, other extra-curricular activities. Sometimes debate programs discourage participation in other activities to hone skills unique to competitive interscholastic debate (e.g. spreading). Furthermore, to the extent that debaters are convinced of their own argument that debate can create social change, the fiction discourages participation in more effective methods of persuasion that do not require the participants to contradict themselves. Students are led to believe that they have accomplished something when, in fact, they have contributed nothing (except to the decline of the community).

Additionally, arguing that debate can create social change by the judge voting for the argument is also unethical. The fiction of social change through debate is powerful because it abuses debate’s structures designed to ensure fairness and minimize arbitrariness in judges’ decision-making. One primary structure is the contractual requirement that when the judges sign their ballots, they are voting for the team that does the better debating, as they have contracted with the tournament to do so. When the judge agrees with the host school to judge, he has promised to vote for the debaters who do the better debating. An argument that voting for one team over the other solely because of some out-of-round benefit compromises the judge’s objectivity of evaluating who did the better debating through the arguments made in the particular debate round. In essence, it is a promise for a benefit outside of the debate round in exchange for the ballot that would outweigh the judge’s sense of duty to remain objective and decide the round on who did the better debating. In this sense, endorsing the fiction of social change through debate is, by definition, is endorsing bribery. The only way this ethical dilemma would not exist would be for debaters relying on the fiction to admit that there really is no out-of-round benefit, which is this article’s ultimate point.

Not only does the fiction unfairly place the judge in an ethical dilemma, it is also unfair by asking the judge to consider and accept out-of-round benefits of voting for a particular team but ignore all of the judge’s and other debaters’ personal outof-round experiences. In debate rounds, judges attempt to adopt neutral, objective paradigms by not disregarding an argument simply because they personally disagree or do not like it. The general motivation for this is to be fair to the students and allow them an opportunity to succeed despite the judge’s idiosyncratic preferences, the full disclosure of which would take too long to explain prior to a debate or write in a paradigm (although some judges definitely try). The fiction of social change through debate invites the judge to insert his or her subjective preferences only to the extent the judge personally agrees. If the judge personally disagrees with the team’s particular social goals, the judge will be shunned by rejecting the team’s argument absent some argument that the opposing team wins “on the flow.” But if the judge personally agrees with the team’s particular social goals (or at least what the debaters purport their social goals to be), then the debaters relying on the fiction of social change through debate invites and attempts to justify judges’ intervention only to the extent it benefits them even if the argument is not won “on the flow.” This is true because arguments about what the ballot can would, if the argument is true (or dropped), outweigh a technically bad performance by the debaters relying on those arguments.

By placing the judge in an ethical dilemma, bribing the judge, and inviting and justifying one-sided intervention, the fiction of social change through debate encourages debaters to commit the ultimate in-round abuse. Arguments and strategies are not, by themselves, properly considered unfair or abusive to another debater. There are always counter-arguments and counter-strategies. Tactics—or the in-round conduct of debaters—can be unfair and abusive. For example, card clipping (purporting to read the entirety of a card but only reading part of it), hiding the other team’s evidence, name-calling, promising the judge money or job in exchange for voting for a particular team, blanket refusal to answer questions in cross-examination, and other rule violations (meaning the actual rules of the debate tournament or the organization under which the tournament is conducted) are all examples of tactics that are unfair and abusive. These tactics and the fiction of social change through debate place the judge in an ethical dilemma, bribe the judge with out-of-round compensation to vote for a team who does not do the better debating, and invite and justify one-sided intervention. They compromise the integrity of the activity and are thus the ultimate unfair tactics and the worst forms of in round abuse.

The fiction of social change through debate abuses the win–loss structure of debate and permits debaters to otherize, demonize, dehumanize, and exclude opponents. The win–loss structure of debate rounds requires a judge to vote for one side or the other, as judges generally cannot give a double win. This precludes the possibility of compromise on any major position in the debate when the resolution of the position would determine the ultimate issue of “which team did the better debating.” Thus, the fiction of social change through debate encourages debaters to construct narratives of good versus evil i

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n which the other team is representative of some evil that threatens to bring about our destruction if it is endorsed (e.g. capitalism). The team relying on the fiction of social change through debate then paints themselves as agents of the good, and gives the judge a George W. Bush-like “option”: “You’re either with us or you’re against us.” The fiction of social change through debate—like Bush’s rhetorical fear tactics and creation of a false, polarizing, and exclusionary dichotomy to justify all parts of the War on Terror—enables the otherization, demonization, dehumanization, and exclusion of the opposing team. When the unfairness of this tactic is brought to light—particularly in egregious situations when a team is arguing that the other team should lose because of their skin color—all can see that the debate centers on personal attacks against opposing debaters. This causes tensions between debaters that frequently result in debaters losing interest or quitting. By alienating and excluding members of the competitive interscholastic debate community for the purpose of winning a debate, it also makes the reaching of any compromise outside of the debate—the only place where compromise is possible—much less likely. By bringing the social issue into a debate round, debaters impede out-of-round progress on the resolution of social issues within and outside the debate community by prompting backlash.

### AT: Participation---1NC

#### Turn---their model magnifies the decline in participation---many programs cannot sustain hybrid teams because their administrations think they shouldn’t spend resources on students from other institutions, leading programs to risk shutting down for violating that policy.

#### There are zero historical examples of successful hybrid teams---MIT/Harvard is the only one in recent memory, and it collapsed.

### AT: Energy---1NC

#### Valuing the ‘win’ as a mode of political gain is an attachment to counterproductive contest models of change that cordon off meaningful change and are structurally incapable of responding to myriad existential threats---refusing this is a method of withdrawal that collapses systems of oppression through attrition

Karlberg 3 – Dr. Michael Karlberg, Professor of Communication at Western Washington University, PhD and MA in Communication from Simon Fraser University, BA in Education from the University of Toronto, “The Paradox of Protest in a Culture of Contest”, Peace & Change, Volume 28, Number 3, July, p. 339-342

THE PARADOX OF PROTEST

Cultural common sense leads many to believe that the best way to organize every social institution is in the form of a contest. Paradoxically, it also leads many to believe that the best way to reform those institutions is through protest—and other adversarial strategies of social change. Protests, demonstrations, partisan organizing, litigation, strikes, and other oppositional strategies are standard methods for pursuing social change. In more extreme cases, violence and terrorism also are employed.

All of these strategies, however, have become paradoxical and self-limiting. If they were viable in the past, they now appear to have reached a point of diminishing returns. Adversarial strategies legitimate the assumptions regarding human nature and social organization that sustain the tripartite system. When social activists engage in partisan political organizing, they legitimate the contest models of governance that keep them at a perpetual disadvantage. Likewise, when social activists engage in litigation, they legitimate the adversarial systems of jurisprudence that keep them at a perpetual disadvantage. Even street protests, demonstrations, and acts of civil disobedience legitimate the underlying assumption that contest and opposition are necessary forms of social interaction.

Granted, social activists do “win” occasional “battles” in these adversarial arenas, but the root causes of their concerns largely remain unaddressed and the larger “wars” arguably are not going well. Consider the case of environmental activism. Countless environmental protests, lobbies, and lawsuits have been mounted in recent generations throughout the Western world. Many small victories have been won. Yet environmental degradation continues to accelerate at a rate that far outpaces the highly circumscribed advances made in these limited battles, and even the most committed environmentalists acknowledge that the overall war is not going well.33

In addition, adversarial strategies of social change embody assumptions that have internal consequences for social movements, such as internal factionalization. For instance, virtually all of the social projects of the “left” throughout the 20th century have suffered from recurrent internal factionalization. The opening decades of the century were marked by political infighting among vanguard communist revolutionaries. The middle decades of the century were marked by theoretical disputes among leftist intellectuals. The century’s closing decades have been marked by the fracturing of the “new left” under the centrifugal pressures of identity politics. Underlying this pattern of infighting and factionalization is the tendency to interpret differences—of class, race, gender, perspective, or strategy—as sources of antagonism and conflict.34

In this regard, the political “left” and “right” both define themselves in terms of a common adversary—the “other”—defined by political differences. Not surprisingly, advocates of both the left and right frequently invoke the need for internal unity in order to prevail over their adversaries on the other side of the alleged political spectrum. However, because the terms left and right are both artificial and reified categories that do not reflect the complexity of actual social relations, values, or beliefs, there is no way to achieve lasting unity within either camp because there are no actual boundaries between them. In reality, social relations, values, and beliefs are infinitely complex and variable. Yet once an adversarial posture is adopted by assuming that differences are sources of conflict, initial distinctions between the left and the right inevitably are followed by subsequent distinctions within the left and the right. Once this centrifugal process is set in motion, it is difficult, if not impossible, to restrain.

For all of these reasons, adversarial strategies have reached a point of diminishing returns. Even if such strategies were necessary and viable in the past, when human populations were less socially and ecologically interdependent, those conditions no longer exist. Our reproductive and technological success as a species has led to conditions of unprecedented interdependence, and no group on the planet is isolated any longer. Under these new conditions, new strategies not only are possible but are essential. Humanity has become a single interdependent social body. In order to meet the complex social and environmental challenges now facing us, we must learn to coordinate our collective actions. Yet a body cannot coordinate its actions as long as its “left” and its “right,” or its “north” and its “south,” or its “east” and its “west” are locked in adversarial relationships.

Pressures for such coordinated collective action are mounting daily. Threats of ecological degradation, resource scarcity, species extinctions, global health pandemics, nuclear and biological contamination, terrorism, military conflict, and so forth all are pressing us to find new modes of collective and coordinated action. Under these conditions, neither the tripartite system of contests nor adversarial strategies of social change are viable any longer.

A CULTURAL GAME THEORY OF SOCIAL CHANGE

If we cannot transform the culture of contest through a culture of protest, how else can we pursue social change? Answering this question requires a fundamental shift in our thinking. To effect this shift, consider the metaphor of a cultural game. Cultural institutions can be conceptualized as “games” that operate according to specific sets of “rules.”35 This metaphor is especially well suited to thinking about the tripartite system of contests and about the strategies that might be employed to change or to transform it.

Within the culture of contest, virtually every institution, or game, operates according to competitive rules. These rules ensure not only that there will be winners and losers but also that the most powerful players are most likely to win. When less powerful players agree to join in these games, they are consenting to play by rules that tend to promote their own defeat. Adversarial strategies of social change, such as protest, are consistent with these competitive rules. Not only do they legitimize the old games, but they also are part of them. Again, they ensure that the most powerful players are more likely to prevail.

There is, however, another strategy: to withdraw your time and energy from the old games in order to construct new ones. The only thing perpetuating the old games (i.e., the tripartite system of contests) is the fact that the majority of people consent to the rules. If alternative games begin to yield recognizable results (i.e., increased social justice and environmental sustainability), then they will begin to attract increasing numbers of people to them (i.e., the majority of people whose interests and values are not well served by the old game). If enough people stop playing by the old rules and start playing by new ones, the old games will come to an end not through protest but through attrition. The alternative strategy, then, is one of construction, attraction, and attrition. This strategy, moreover, is entirely nonadversarial. It reconciles the means of social change with the ends of a peaceful and just social order.

At first glance this may sound like a naive retreat from the hard work that needs to be done to pursue social change, but the cultural game theory suggests exactly the opposite. Activists pursuing adversarial strategies of social change are consenting to play by the old rules that promote their own defeat. Such is the hegemony of the culture of contest. Even those who protest and fight for social change are, in effect, contained within its hegemonic boundaries. Yet contrary to “common sense” within the culture of contest, social change does not require defeating oppressors or taking on opponents through adversarial means, nor does it require attacking those who profit most from the old rules of engagement. Rather, it requires that we recognize the hegemonic nature of the old competitive and adversarial games, that we withdraw our time and energy from them, and that we invest that time and energy in the construction of new ones.

This recognition dissolves the paradox created by the culture of protest. Increasing numbers of people are beginning to recognize this intuitively. Consider the cooperative economics movement in all its manifestations. Throughout the planet, diverse people are recognizing that their values and interests often are served better by entering into various types of cooperative economic arrangements. Worker cooperatives and micro-credit cooperatives are emerging on the supply side of the economy in many parts of the world as many previously exploited artisans, craftspeople, small farmers, and others recognize their common interests in reducing third-person handling costs while increasing access to previously inaccessible credit, capital, and markets.36 Likewise, consumer cooperatives are emerging on the demand side of the economy as growing numbers of consumers recognize their common interests in socially responsible volume purchasing.37 Even within traditional capitalist enterprises, profit-sharing models are gaining prominence as owners begin to recognize their essential interdependence with workers.

# 2NC

# 1NR

## Capitalism K

### AT: Framework

#### Neoliberalism structures identity even if they are opposed to it---that crushes value to life and amplifies battle fatigue.

Srnicek & Williams 15 **–** Nick Srnicek is a Lecturer at City University London and a PhD from the London School of Economics; Alex Williams is a Lecturer at City University London [*Inventing the Future: Postcapitalism and a World Without Work*, Verso Books, p. 137-142]

As we have seen, neoliberalism propagated its ideology through a division of labour – academics shaping education, think tanks influencing policy, and popularisers manipulating the media. The inculcation of neoliberalism involved a full-spectrum project of constructing a hegemonic worldview. A new common sense was built that came to co-opt and eventually dominate the terminology of ‘modernity’ and ‘freedom’ – terminology that fifty years ago would have had very different connotations. Today, it is nearly impossible to speak these words without immediately invoking the precepts of neoliberal capitalism.

We all know today that ‘modernisation’ translates into job cuts, the slashing of welfare and the privatisation of government services. To modernise, today, simply means to neoliberalise. The term ‘freedom’ has suffered a similar fate, reduced to individual freedom, freedom from the state, and the freedom to choose between consumer goods. Liberal ideas of individual freedom played an important role in the ideological struggle with the USSR, priming the population of the Western world to mobilise behind any ideology that purported to value individual freedoms. With its emphasis on individual freedoms, neoliberalism was able to co-opt elements of movements organised around ‘libertarianism, identity politics, [and] multiculturalism’.55 Likewise, by emphasising freedom from the state, neoliberalism was able to appeal to anarcho-capitalists and the movements of desire that exploded in May 1968.56 Lastly, with the idea of freedom being limited to a freedom of the market, the ideology could co-opt consumerist desires. At the level of production, neoliberal freedom could also recruit emerging desires among workers for flexible labour – desires that were soon turned against them.57 In struggling for and successfully seizing the ideological terrain of modernity and freedom, neoliberalism has managed to wind its way inexorably into our very self-conceptions. In arrogating the meaning of terms such as modernisation and freedom, neoliberalism has proved itself to be the single most successful hegemonic project of the last fifty years.

Neoliberalism has thus become ‘the form of our existence – the way in which we are led to conduct ourselves, to relate to others and to ourselves’.58 It is, in other words, not just politicians, business leaders, the media elite and academics who have been enrolled into this vision of the world, but also workers, students, migrants – and everyone else. In other words, neoliberalism creates subjects. Paradigmatically, we are constructed as competitive subjects – a role that encompasses and surpasses industrial capitalism’s productive subject. The imperatives of neoliberalism drive these subjects to constant self-improvement in every aspect of their lives. Perpetual education, the omnipresent requirement to be employable, and the constant need for self-reinvention are all of a piece with this neoliberal subjectivity.59 The competitive subject, moreover, straddles the divide between the public and the private. One’s personal life is as bound to competition as one’s work life. Under these conditions, it is no surprise that anxiety proliferates in contemporary societies. Indeed, an entire battery of psychopathologies has been exacerbated under neoliberalism: stress, anxiety, depression and attention deficit disorders are increasingly common psychological responses to the world around us.60 Crucially, the construction of everyday neoliberalism has also been a primary source of political passivity. Even if you do not buy into the ideology, its effects nevertheless force you into increasingly precarious situations and increasingly entrepreneurial inclinations. We need money to survive, so we market ourselves, do multiple jobs, stress and worry about how to pay rent, pinch pennies at the at the grocery store, and turn socialising into networking. Given these effects, political mobilisation becomes a dream that is perpetually postponed, driven away by the anxieties and pressures of everyday life.

At the same time, we should recognise that this production of subjectivity was not simply an external imposition. Hegemony, in all its forms, operates not as an illusion, but as something that builds on the very real desires of the population. Neoliberal hegemony has played upon ideas, yearnings and drives already existing within society, mobilising and promising to fulfill those that could be aligned with its basic agenda. The worship of individual freedom, the value ascribed to hard work, freedom from the rigid work week, individual expression through work, the belief in meritocracy, the bitterness felt at corrupt politicians, unions and bureaucracies – these beliefs and desires pre-exist neoliberalism and find expression in it.61 Bridging the left–right divide, many people today are simply angry at what they see as others taking advantage of the system. Hatred for the rich tax evader combines easily with disgust for the poor welfare cheat; anger at the oppressive employer becomes indistinguishable from anger at all politicians. This is linked with the spread of middle-class identities and aspirations – desires for home ownership, self-reliance and entrepreneurial spirit were fostered and extended into formerly working-class social spaces.62 Neoliberal ideology has a grounding in lived experience and does not exist simply as an academic puzzle.63 Neoliberalism has become parasitical on everyday experience, and any critical analysis that misses this is bound to misrecognise the deep roots of neoliberalism in today’s society. Over the course of decades, neoliberalism has therefore come to shape not only elite opinions and beliefs, but also the normative fabric of everyday life itself. The particular interests of neoliberals have become universalised, which is to say, hegemonic.64 Neoliberalism constitutes our collective common sense, making us its subjects whether we believe in it or not.65

### Perm---AT: Do Both

#### We can’t ‘do both.’

Melissa Naschek 18, Co-Chair of the Philadelphia Democratic Socialists of America, 8/28/18, “The Identity Mistake,” https://www.jacobinmag.com/2018/08/mistaken-identity-asaid-haider-review-identity-politics.

We Can’t “Do Both” Today, with the popularity of Bernie Sanders and a resurgence in trade union activity, circumstances are finally re-emerging for a political program capable of fostering mass working-class solidarity. Instead, Haider would have us turn to the model that has failed the working class for years: rhetorically accepting identity-based particularism at the implicit expense of class-based universalism. Of course, Haider does not overtly suggest that this is an either/or. Instead, he insists that we must do both — working-class politics and identity politics. But “doing both” is easier said than done. Identity politics and class politics understand capitalist power structures in distinct ways and therefore lead to distinct political strategies. More importantly, however, “doing both” misreads the balance of power in America today: institutionally on the Left, we have nothing but a fraction of the already miniscule labor movement to back our platform and our analysis. But liberalism has a major political party, the media, academia, and the entire world of nonprofits, which today controls about as much wealth as the Church did before the French Revolution. And it’s in the “do both” strategy that these powerful enemies of the Left (and allies of capital) worm their way into our coalition and play up identity to reshape working-class demands until they’re neutralized. Haider fails to recognize the profound asymmetry between the power of institutions of the working-class and the advocates of universal class-based reforms, and those of the liberal establishment and their own embrace of identity-based particularism. Concretely, this asymmetry does not lead to the best of identity politics and the best of universal demands in some sort of synthesis. Instead, the lopsided advocacy for particularist demands serves only to further marginalize the universalist demands. An anticapitalist politics capable of fighting against such forces must appeal to the whole working class to build a mass movement. Masses of people become interested in politics when organizations offer a real possibility to change their lives for the better. The only way to forge a movement capable of achieving that is by fighting for shared working-class political and economic interests. This remains the only plausible path to harnessing the only power offered to workers in society: their position as an exploited majority. The good news is that the needs for affordable medical care, a livable planet, quality education, and respect and security in the workplace satisfy such a mandate. It is two of Mistaken Identity’s supposed interlocutors, Barbara J. Fields and Karen Fields, who note that downplaying class demands “is a devastating, intolerable mistake. It leads people to say that race is fundamental — not economics, not class — and if you bring class in then you’re trying to deny the reality of human existence and identity. That is the big mystification achieved by racecraft.”